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Abstract
This paper examines the implications of different monetary and fiscal policy rules in an economy
characterized by Harrodian instability. We show that (i) a monetary rule along Taylor lines can
be stabilizing for low debt ratios but becomes de-stabilizing if the debt ratio exceeds a certain
threshold, (ii) a ‘Keynesian’ fiscal policy rule can stabilize the economy at full employment, (iii) a
fiscal ‘austerity’ rule that links fiscal parameters to deviations from a target debt ratio fails to adjust
the ‘warranted’ to the ‘natural’ growth rate and destabilizes the warranted path, (iv) instability
may arise from a combination of fiscal and monetary policy rules which separately would stabilize
the system, and (v) austerity rules can in some circumstances enhance the stabilizing effects of
monetary policy.
JEL classification: E12, E52, E62, E63
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1 Introduction
Most of the current literature on fiscal and monetary policy rules consider a New Keynesian DSGE
framework. The implications of a policy rule, however, depend on the properties of the economy in
which it operates, and the conclusions derived from these models may not be robust.
One notable feature of DSGE models is the absence of endogenous tendencies to instability; fluc-
tuations arise solely as the result of exogenous stochastic shocks. There are many potential sources of
instability but multiplier-accelerator mechanisms in various forms have – rightly, in our view – received
great attention in the Keynesian literature.1 In this paper we take a benchmark Harrodian model as
our point of departure and leave out other possible sources of instability (Minskian instability, for
instance).
Extending the Harrodian analysis to a corporate economy with explicit financial assets, we examine
the implications of different fiscal policy rules, both alone and in combination with a Taylor rule for
monetary policy. The term ‘policy rule’ is used in a weak sense. The emphasis on fiscal and monetary
rules is often motivated by the biases that allegedly arise from discretionary policy; monetary policy,
it is argued, is subject to an inflation bias and fiscal policy suffers from deficit biases (Kopits 2001,
∗Early versions of this paper have been presented at the Fields Institute (Toronto), the Eastern Economic Association
Meetings (Boston), the 12th International Conference on Post Keynesian Economics (Kansas City), Research Network
Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Policies (Berlin), and Analytical Political Economy Workshop (University of Notre
Dame). We would like to thank the participants, Reiner Franke and Glenn Ierley for useful discussions. Peter Skott’s
research for this paper was supported by a grant from Institute for New Economic Thinking (#1N013-00052).
†Department of Finance and Economics, Adelphi University, Garden City, NY 11530, USA; email: sryoo@.adelphi.edu
‡(Corresponding author) Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003,USA, and
Aalborg University; email: pskott@econs.umass.edu.
1Harrod (1939), Samuelson (1939), Kaldor (1940) and Hicks (1950) are classic contributions. More recent work
includes Skott (1989, 2015a), Chiarella et al. (2005), Fazzari et al. (2013), von Arnim and Barrales (2015).
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Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011). We use the term ‘policy rule’ simply as a short-hand for systematic
policy patterns, whether or not these patterns are the result of binding rules.
We show that (i) a monetary rule along Taylor lines can be stabilizing for low debt ratios but
becomes de-stabilizing if the debt ratio exceeds a certain threshold, (ii) a Keynesian fiscal policy
rule can bring the ‘warranted growth rate’ into line with the ‘natural growth rate’ and stabilize the
economy at the warranted rate, (iii) a fiscal austerity rule (which links fiscal parameters to deviations
from a target debt ratio) fails to adjust the warranted to the natural growth rate and destabilizes the
warranted path, (iv) instability may arise from a combination of fiscal and monetary policy rules which
separately would stabilize the system, and (v) austerity rules can in some circumstances enhance the
stabilizing effects of monetary policy (compared to a completely passive fiscal policy).
The analysis is informed by a ‘functional finance’ approach (Lerner 1943).2 We evaluate monetary
and fiscal policies based on their ability to stabilize the economy at full employment, avoid inflation
and ensure a desired level of investment. Public deficits and public debt emerge as the consequence of
the policy but have no independent value.3
Our conclusions are very different from contemporary orthodoxy. A benchmark RBC model, first,
has no aggregate demand problems. When New Keynesian imperfections are added, stochastic shocks
and price rigidities may give rise to short-run aggregate demand problems, but there is no need
for aggregate demand policy in the long run. A fully optimal policy may be quite complex, but
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) and Kirsinova et al. (2009) find minimal welfare losses compared to
a fully optimal policy if monetary policy is used for short-run stabilization while taxes (or government
spending) are set as an increasing (decreasing) function of the deviation of actual from target debt.
This austerity rule for fiscal policy is destabilizing in our setting.
The share of investment in output (and the capital intensity of production), second, will be optimal
if saving and investment are determined by intertemporally optimizing households with an infinite
horizon. This optimality property is quite fragile and does not extend to models in which agents
have a finite horizon. Skott and Ryoo (2014) analyze combinations of fiscal and monetary policy that
are consistent with continuous full employment and a desired capital intensity in a standard OLG
setting. The analysis shows how the implied trajectory for debt depends on, inter alia, the growth
rate of the economy and the share of government consumption in total income: both increases in the
growth rate and, somewhat paradoxically, increases in government consumption reduce the long-run
debt ratio. The OLG structure and the assumptions about household behavior are quite orthodox in
this and a companion paper which includes Keynesian problems of aggregate demand and long-run
variations on confidence (Skott and Ryoo 2015). Similar long-run results linking the required debt ratio
to government spending, the growth rate and the structure of taxation can be obtained in Keynesian
models of a corporate economy (Schlicht 2006, Godley and Lavoie 2007, Ryoo and Skott 2013). The
long-run analysis in these papers has serious limitations, however, if the steady growth path is unstable.
The model in this paper has steady-growth properties that are similar to those in Ryoo and Skott
(2013). The structure of taxation is simpler in the present paper, but the main difference is the
introduction of short-run dynamics and a more complicated policy problem. Ryoo and Skott (2013)
analyzed how full employment could be maintained, starting from a position with the desired capital
intensity and full employment, and assuming that the capital stock grows at the ‘natural rate’. In this
paper, the initial position is arbitrary and investment is determined endogenously along Harrodian
2Lerner’s principle of functional finance
”prescribes, first, the adjustment of total spending (by everybody in the economy, including the government)
in order to eliminate both unemployment and inflation...; second, the adjustment of public holdings of
money and of government bonds, by government borrowing or debt repayment, in order to achieve the rate
of interest which results in the most desirable level of investment; and, third, the printing, hoarding or
destruction of money as needed for carrying out the first two parts of the program.” (Lerner 1943, p. 41)
3Skott (2015b) and Skott and Ryoo (2015) discuss functional finance in relation to ‘secular stagnation.’
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lines.
Stabilization issues have been addressed by a substantial (post-) Keynesian literature, including
Lima and Setterfield (2008), Asada et al (2010), Franke (2015), Costa Lima et al. (2014) and Mason
and Jayadev (2014). The papers by Franke and Mason and Jayadev are probably the closest to our
analysis. Franke considers the use of monetary policy to stabilize a Harrodian economy. He does not
include fiscal policy, however; there are no financial assets, and his specification of household behavior
leaves out wealth effects. Like us, Mason and Jayadev analyze the implications of different fiscal rules
and discuss interactions between monetary and fiscal policy, but the setting is different.4 Using a short-
run IS equation and a Phillips curve, Mason and Jayadev focus on how different policy assignments
affect the stability of a short-run target equilibrium characterized by full employment and a constant
debt ratio.
The analysis of fiscal policy and debt dynamics in an unstable economy inevitably becomes quite
complex: it is hard to keep the number of state variables low. Asada et al. (2010) consider systems
with up to nine state variables; Costa Lima et al. (2014) keep the system at five state variables but
leave out Keynesian demand problems and do not include Harrodian elements (which typically add
an extra state variable). Large systems may allow more ‘realistic’ assumptions but make it hard to
identify robust results and disentangle the various mechanisms behind the results. Our approach in
this paper is to (i) focus on a particular source of instability and (ii) specify policy rules in a way that
keeps the dimension of the system as low as possible without sacrificing essential characteristics of the
policies. Clearly this approach also has drawbacks. We return to these issues in the conclusion.
The rest of the paper falls in five sections. Section 2 lays out our extended Harrodian setting. Policy
rules are introduced in Section 3 and section 4 analyzes the implications of the different rules for the
stability properties of the full employment path. Section 5 presents some illustrative simulations.
Section 6 concludes.
2 General setting
2.1 Harrodian benchmark
Consider a one-sector Harrodian economy without a public sector. Denoting aggregate output and the
capital stock by Y and K, and assuming a Leontief technology, let u = Y/K be the indicator of the
rate of capacity utilization. A simple Harrodian specification relates the change in accumulation to
the difference between actual and desired utilization:
g˙ = λ(u− ud) (1)
where g = Kˆ = I/K − δ is the rate of accumulation and ud represents the desired utilization rate. I
and δ are real (gross) investment and the capital depreciation rate, respectively. Combining equation
(1) with a traditional consumption function, the warranted growth rate is given by (see Appendix A)
gw = (1− c)ud − δ (2)
where 1− c is the saving rate.
For arbitrary exogenous values of ud, c and δ, the warranted rate will only by a fluke be equal to
an exogenously given natural rate, n.5 A reconciliation between warranted and natural growth rates
could be accomplished along Malthusian lines by endogenizing the natural rate (Leon-Ledesma and
4Using very different models, the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy have also been analyzed by, among
others, Sargent and Wallace (1981) and Leeper (1991).
5The natural growth rate may include technical change; we use n to denote the sum of the growth rate of the labor
force and the rate of Harrod-neutral technical change.
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Thirlwall 2002, Dutt 2006). We consider it implausible, however, to suppose that the natural rate
adjusts fully to whatever the warranted rate may be. Hence, part of the adjustment must fall on the
warranted rate, and to simplify the exposition we take the natural rate as exogenous. The extent of the
required adjustment in the warranted rate will be smaller if there is some flexibility in the natural rate,
but the qualitative adjustment problem is the same, as long as the natural rate does not accommodate
fully.
Adjustments in the warranted rate can come about through changes in ud or 1− c. The choice of
technique and the output-capital ratio may adjust in response to changes in factor prices (the Solow
route); alternatively, the saving rate may adjust via Ramsey optimization, via differential saving rates
for profit and wage income, or via fiscal policy. In this paper we focus on policy: monetary policy may
affect the output-capital ratio and fiscal policy the rate of saving.
Harrod’s second problem concerns the instability of the warranted growth path. The benchmark
model implies that an accumulation rate above (below) the warranted rate induces a further increase
(decrease) in the accumulation rate (see Appendix A). Thus, policy needs to stabilize the actual growth
rate as well as ensure the adjustment of the warranted rate to the natural rate.
Subsections 2.2-2.3 consider the equalization of the warranted and natural rates; the stability
question is the subject of section 3.
2.2 An extended Harrodian model
2.2.1 Interest rates and the choice of technique
The Leontief assumption in the benchmark model may seem highly restrictive. It can be seen, however,
as a long-run implication of functional finance.
The desired level of investment is not constant in steady growth, and Lerner’s prescription to
set the interest rate so as to achieve the “most desirable level of investment” (Lerner 1943, p. 41)
has long-run implications for the choice of technique. Like output and the capital stock, the level of
investment will grow at the steady growth rate, keeping constant the capital-output ratio. The steady-
growth version of ‘the desired level of investment’ therefore becomes ’the desired ratio of investment
to output’ or, equivalently, the ’desired output-capital ratio’. If σ is the desired output-capital ratio,
functional finance prescribes that the interest rate be chosen so as to induce firms to choose a technique
described by the Leontief production function,6
Y = min{σK,L} (3)
L is employment in efficiency units and, without loss of generality, we have chosen units to get a labor
productivity of one (if there is technical change, an efficiency unit of labor corresponds to a steadily
decreasing amount labor time). The σ parameter defines the maximum output-capital ratio (given the
chosen technique).
The steady-growth solution must have r = r¯ where r¯ is the real interest rate associated with the
optimal capital intensity σ, but short-run variations in r may be used to stabilize the system at the
steady growth path.7 The inherited stock of fixed capital severely limits the scope for changes in
the capital intensity in the short run and, as highlighted by the capital controversy, the possibility of
reswitching and capital reversing makes the effects of changes in r on the choice of technique uncertain.
6A formalization of the argument can be found in Skott (1989, chapter 5) and Skott and Ryoo (2015). The capital
controversy in the 1960s and 1970s highlighted the difficulties of constructing an aggregate production function and
demonstrated, in particular, how theories that rely on movements along a smooth production function face intrinsic
problems and contradiction. But the insights from the capital controversy do not imply that only one technique is
available; nor do they invalidate the influence of the cost of finance on the choice of technique. For simplicity we take
the cost of finance to be equal to the real rate of interest.
7For simplicity we assume that that r¯ is unique. Depending on the set of potential techniques, multiple values of the
interest rate may be consistent with the same choice of technique.
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It therefore seems reasonable to treat the capital intensity – the Leontief production function (3) –
as independent of short-term deviations of r from r¯. This assumption does not exclude interest rate
effects on investment. Firms typically want to hold excess capacity, and standard motivations for
firms to maintain excess capacity imply that the desired utilization rate depends on the cost of finance
(Skott 1989). Excess capacity, for instance, enables a firm to take advantage of sudden increases in
demand, but this potential benefit has to be balanced against the costs of maintaining excess capacity.
The costs are increasing in the cost of finance, and the desired utilization rate will therefore depend
positively on the real interest rate. This relation between interest rate and desired utilization is not
affected by the capital controversy. Using a linear specification we assume that
ud = u∗ + θ(r − r¯), θ > 0 (4)
where u∗ denotes the desired utilization rate at r = r¯.
Equation (4) and the investment function (1) imply that the interest rate influences the rates of
change of investment and aggregate demand but leave the rate of accumulation g as predetermined
at any moment. Most short-run specifications of investment, by contrast, allow for contemporaneous
effects of the interest rate on the level investment. Our extended Harrodian formulation in equations
(4)-(6) therefore includes both level and rate-of-change effects:
g = a+ a1(u− ud)− a2(r − r¯); a1 > 0, a2 > 0 (5)
a˙ = λ(u− ud) (6)
where ud is given by (4).
2.2.2 Government consumption, taxes and public debt
The benchmark model has no public sector which is clearly a non-starter for an analysis of fiscal policy.
Adding a public sector, we consider two potential fiscal instruments: government consumption and a
tax rate.
For present purposes it seems reasonable to treat the long-run ratio of government consumption
to the capital stock as structurally determined; the need for schools, bridges, police officers, etc. will
typically depend on the size of the economy. Thus, we take the steady-growth value of the ratio of
real government consumption (G) to the capital stock as exogenously given,
G/K = γ¯ (7)
This exogeneity assumption glosses over the fact that the value of γ – the appropriate size of government
– is strongly contested. Arguably, however, the different positions on this issue are largely tangential
to the Harrodian problems of influencing the warranted rate.
Having fixed the long-run value of γ, the tax rate is determined endogenously by a fiscal rule. We
assume a uniform tax rate τ on all household income, that is, on the sum of wages, dividends and
(real) interest on both government and corporate debt. Formally, tax revenues are given by
T = τ [pY −R+ iB − pi(B +D)] (8)
where i and r = i−pi are the nominal and real interest rates; T is total nominal taxes (net of transfers);
p is the goods price and pi = pˆ the rate of inflation; B is public debt; D and R are corporate debt and
retained earnings;8 ‘hats’ above a variable are used to denote a growth rate (xˆ = (dx/dt)/x).9
8We have
pY = W + Π = W +Div + iD +R
where W,Π, Div,D, R and i denote wages, profits, dividends, corporate debt, retained earnings and the nominal interest
rate.
9Equation (8) assumes that households are taxed only on the real return on their financial assets. As an alternative,
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Government debt is predetermined at any moment but evolves over time,
B˙ = iB + pG− T
= iB + γpK − τ(pY −R+ rB − piD) (9)
Thus, the dynamics of the debt-capital ratio are given by
b˙ = (r − g)b+ γ − τ
(
u− R
pK
− pi D
pK
+ rb
)
(10)
where b = B/(pK).
2.2.3 Private consumption
Consumption decisions typically depend on non-human wealth and expected future wage income, as
well as on current disposable income. The proportional consumption assumption in the benchmark
model therefore needs to be modified.
In a corporate economy households’ ownership of productive capital takes the form of equity.
Disregarding housing and other, less important real assets, we assume that household wealth consists
of equity and safe, short-term assets with a contractual rate of return.10 The safe assets could include
both bonds and bank deposits. For present purposes, however, the introduction of bank deposits
would add very little, and we include only bonds. We treat corporate and government bonds as
perfect substitutes.
Firms can issue new equity or buy back shares; they issue bonds, and they retain a proportion of
their earnings. Our main focus in this paper is on public debt, and we simplify firms’ financial behavior
by assuming that (i) there is no net new issues of shares (N˙ = 0) by the corporate sector and that
(ii) adjustments in the retention rate keep constant the debt-capital ratio for the corporate sector as
a whole.11 Formally,
D = d¯pK (11)
and
D˙ = d¯pK(pi + Kˆ) (12)
These assumptions imply that firms’ finance constraint can be written
pI = R+ D˙ + vN˙ = R+ D˙ = R+ d¯pK(pi + Kˆ) (13)
v is the price of shares and N the number of shares. The second equality follows from the assumption of
no net equity issue and the third from differentiation of (11). Using (13) the ratio of retained earnings
to capital can be written
R
pK
= (1− d¯)g − d¯pi + δ (14)
where δ is the rate of depreciation of capital.
they could be taxed on the nominal return. Algebraically,
T = τ(pY −R+ iB)
This specification introduces inflation distortions: post-tax returns on bonds will be different if two otherwise identical
economies have different inflation rates. These inflation effects would modify some of the quantitative results.
10Government bonds are taken to be short-term (always selling at par value). Treasury bills and notes make up about
80 percent of US government debt.
11The net issue of new equity in the US was positive but small (relative to total investment) in the early post war
period but turned negative from the 1980s as buybacks increased.
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Households’ disposable income, Y D, is given by
pY D = [pY −R+ iB]− τ [pY + iB −R− pi(D +B)] (15)
and the consolidated budget constraint for the household sector can be written
pY D = pC + vN˙ + B˙ + D˙ (16)
By assumption, N˙ = 0 and equation (16) can be rewritten
pC = pY D − (B˙ + D˙) (17)
Our description of consumption now follows the approach in Skott (1981, 1989) and Skott and
Ryoo (2008). We assume that
(B +D)∗ = βpC (18)
(vN)∗ = αpC (19)
where an asterisk is used to denote a target value, and β and α represent target stock-flow ratios.
Assuming that households want to adjust their real bond holdings gradually towards the target level,
we have
(B̂ +D)d − pi = κ (B +D)
∗ − (B +D)
B +D
(20)
or
(B˙ + D˙)d = κ((B +D)∗ − (B +D)) + pi(B +D) (21)
where (B˙ + D˙)d is the household flow demand for bonds. In equilibrium, this household flow demand
must match the new bond issues, as given by equations (9) and (12)
Combining (17), (21), (18) and (12), and dividing through by pK, we now get the consumption
function
C
K
= c(1− τ)[u− δ − (1− d¯)g + rb] + cν(b+ d¯) (22)
where c = 1/(1 + κβ) and cν = κ/(1 + κβ).
12 Bond holdings represent a fraction of wealth and
the parameter cν therefore does not express the consumption propensity out of total wealth. If,
say, β/(α + β) = 0.25, a ballpark empirical estimate of 0.05 for the wealth effects on consumption
corresponds to cν = 0.20.
It should be noted that the target value α for the ratio of equity to consumption plays no role for
aggregate consumption. Since there is no net issue of new equity, households as a group are unable to
spend current income on the purchase of new shares; any attempt to do so simply generates capital
gains as the price of shares is bid up until the target stock-flow ratio has been reached.13 The target
value β for the ratio of bonds to consumption affects the consumption rates c and cν , and the value
of β could depend on expected rates of return as well as on expected future incomes. An increase in
the interest rate r, for instance, could shift the desired portfolio towards bonds and raise β/(α + β);
the income effect from higher returns, on the other hand, reduces the need to save for retirement
which may lead to a decline in α+ β. The net effect on the target stock-flow ratio β and thereby the
parameters c and cν is ambiguous. We leave out these complications and treat β as a constant.
12The alternative tax specification in which the tax rate applies to nominal disposable income would modify this
equation, introducing a negative effect of inflation on consumption: if households are being taxed on the nominal return
(i(B +D)), not the real return (r(B +D)), an increase in inflation would raise taxation and reduce consumption.
13These induced capital gains are the key to Kaldor’s ‘neo-Pasinetti theorem’; Kaldor (1966), Skott (1981).
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2.2.4 Inflation
The benchmark model is silent about inflation. Our extended model assumes an expectations-augmented
Phillips curve:
pi = pie + η1(u− u∗) + η2(k − k∗) (23)
where pie is expected inflation and k is the ratio of capital K to the labor force, Lf . The value of k is
related to the employment rate e via14
e = uk.
k∗ in (23) refers to the level of k that is required for full employment steady growth, i.e., k∗ = e∗/u∗
where e∗ represents full employment. It is assumed throughout this paper that full employment is well
defined and determined independently of aggregate demand.15
The specification (23) generalizes a standard equation in which unanticipated inflation is determined
by the employment rate e: it allows the utilization rate to influence inflation directly, in addition to
its indirect effects via the employment rate.16
We assume an adaptive inflation expectations,
p˙ie = µ(pi − pie) (24)
and, substituting (23) in (24), we have:
p˙ie = µη1(u− u∗) + µη2(k − k∗) (25)
2.3 Steady growth
Using (7) and (22), the equilibrium condition for the goods market – Y = C + I +G – becomes
u = c(1− τ)[u− δ − (1− d¯)g + rb] + cν(b+ d¯) + g + δ + γ¯ (26)
or
u =
1− c(1− τ)(1− d¯)
1− c(1− τ) g +
c(1− τ)r + cν
1− c(1− τ) b
+
1
1− c(1− τ) γ¯ +
cν
1− c(1− τ) d¯+ δ (27)
In steady growth with full employment we have b˙ = a˙ = 0, r = r¯, ud = u∗ and g = n. Hence – using
equations (6), (27), (14) and (10) – we can solve for the steady-growth value of b and the associated
14The employment rate can be written
e =
L
Lf
=
L
Y
Y
K
K
Lf
= uk
where (by choice of units) L/Y = 1
15Hysteresis and money illusion make this simplifying assumption questionable. For present purposes, however, the
assumption is relatively harmless.
16If
pi = pie + f(e) + g(u)
then, using a first-order approximation, we have
pi = pie + f(e) + g(u)
= pie + f ′(e∗)[k∗(u− u∗) + u∗(k − k∗)] + g′(u)(u− u∗)
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tax rate τ :
b∗ =
(1− c)(u∗ − γ¯ − n− δ)
cn+ cν
− d¯ (28)
τ∗ = 1− u
∗ + nb∗ − γ¯ − (1− d¯)n− δ
u∗ + r¯b∗ − (1− d¯)n− δ (29)
Equations (28)-(29) describe long-run fiscal requirements for full-employment growth. They are nec-
essary but not sufficient for continuous full employment: in addition to the growth condition g = n,
the ratio of the capital stock to the labor force k must be at k∗ (≡ e∗/u∗).
Equation (28) has two striking implications. The long-run debt ratio, first, is inversely related to
government consumption. Austerity policies which cut public consumption with the aim of reducing
debt are counter-productive: if full employment is to be maintained, the result of these policies is to
raise the long-run debt ratio. Intuitively, the contractionary impact of a cut in government consumption
has to be countered by a reduction in taxes. With a positive balanced budget multiplier, the tax
reduction must exceed the cut in government consumption, and the resulting increase in the government
deficit leads to a rise in the long-run debt ratio. Second, a decline in the natural growth rate – whether
because of lower productivity growth or a lower growth of the labor force – will raise the required debt
ratio. Empirical findings of a negative correlation between growth and debt are consistent with this
result. But the causation is from growth to debt, and the correlation does not imply that lower debt
will raise the growth rate.17
Equation (28) describes the stationary solution for the debt ratio. This stationary solution is
conditionally stable: setting g = n, r = r¯ and u = u∗, the full-employment trajectory of the debt ratio
converges to b∗. To see this, combine the equilibrium condition (27) with the dynamic equation (10)
and the expression for retained earnings, equation (14), to get
b˙ = −
(
cν + cn
c
)
b+
(1− c)(ud − γ¯)− n− δ − (cν + cn)d¯
c
(30)
The coefficient on b is negative, and stability follows.
2.4 Automatic stabilizers and Harrodian instability
The conditional stability result is based on restrictive assumptions: it is assumed that accumulation
is at the natural rate throughout the process and that tax rates are continuously adjusted so as to
maintain utilization at the desired rate. A complete stability analysis needs to relax these assumptions
and consider the dynamics starting from arbitrary initial conditions.
Arbitrary starting points in combination with the inherent instability of the Harrodian process
complicate policy. In the conditional stability analysis leading to (30), tax policy was adjusted to
maintain u = ud = u∗. This relatively simple policy no longer suffices if the initial position is one
with g 6= n or e 6= e∗. But before introducing more complex fiscal and monetary policy rules, it
should be noted that, even without active short-run policy adjustment, the introduction of a public
sector exerts a stabilizing influence. This happens both because of the dampening effect of taxes on
the multiplier and because of the effects of public debt on consumption. In principle these automatic
stabilizers could eliminate the instability but plausible parameters values suggest that this is not the
case: modest values of λ are sufficient to produce instability (see Appendix B).
17These steady-growth results can be obtained in other settings; e.g. Schlicht (2006), Godley and Lavoie (2008), Ryoo
and Skott (2013), Skott and Ryoo (2014, 2015), and Skott (2015b).
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3 Policy rules
We have taken the long-run level of government consumption (as a ratio of the capital stock) to be
determined by the ‘needs for government provided services’ (cf. section 2.2.2). There may be good
reasons, however, to treat government consumption as the active instrument for short-run stabilization.
Changes in tax rates, first, may be harder to implement quickly than adjustments in the timing
of government consumption, and short-run variations in taxes, second, may have limited effects on
consumption. Thus, we take γ as the active instrument in the short run and assume that tax rates are
kept constant at the steady-growth value in (29). This assumption is not critical; analogous results
could be obtained using τ as the active instrument.
We consider two different fiscal regimes: a ‘functional finance’ regime that targets full employment
and a ‘sound finance’ regime that targets the debt ratio. ‘Perfect’ implementations of these policies
maintain full employment (in the case of functional finance) or the desired debt ratio (in the case of
sound finance) at all times. Deviations from the targets occur under imperfect implementation. The
fiscal regimes are analyzed in two scenarios. Monetary policy is completely passive in one scenario:
the real rate of interest is kept constant at r¯. The other scenario includes a Taylor rule for monetary
policy.
Our Taylor rule assumes that the nominal interest rate, i, is determined by the utilization rate u,
the ratio of the capital stock to the labor force, k = K/Lf , and the inflation rate:
i = r¯ + piT + ρ1(u− u∗) + ρ2(k − k∗) + ρ3(pi − piT ) (31)
where pi and piT denote actual and target inflation; u∗ and k∗ = e∗/u∗ are the steady-growth values
of u and k and e∗ represents full employment. The parameters satisfy ρ1 ≥ 0, ρ2 ≥ 0 and ρ3 > 1. The
specification in equation (31) represents a slight generalization of the standard Taylor formulation in
that it allows for an influence of both employment and utilization in the interest rate.18
Using the Fisher equation r = i− pie and plugging (23) into (31), the Taylor rule can written as
r = r¯ + (ρ1 + η1ρ3)(u− u∗) + (ρ2 + η2ρ3)(k − k∗) + (ρ3 − 1)(pie − piT )
≡ r¯ + ρ˜1(u− u∗) + ρ˜2(k − k∗) + ρ˜3(pie − piT ) (32)
where ρ˜1 ≡ ρ1 + η1ρ3 > 0, ρ˜2 ≡ ρ2 + η2ρ3 > 0 and ρ˜3 ≡ ρ3 − 1 > 0.
The interest rate affects investment in two ways: an increase in real interest rates has an immediate
negative effect (equation (5)) as well as a delayed effect via the state variable a (equations (4) and
(6)). The consumption function (22) includes a positive effect of interest rates on disposable incomes.
Functional finance Algebraically, perfect functional finance implies that
uk = e∗ (33)
The complete stabilization of the employment rate at e∗ may be desirable but in practice unattain-
able.19 The ability of policy makers to neutralize the effects of changes in accumulation (changes in
a) by adjustments in government consumption seems particularly questionable. We therefore consider
a specification that allows effects of a on the utilization rate:
u = u∗ +H(a, k), H1 ≥ 0, H2 < 0, H(n, k∗) = 0 (34)
18Equation (31) can be seen as a linear approximation to the following general specification:
i = f(e, u, pi)
= f(uk, u, pi)
19Arguably, perfect functional finance could be achieved through employer-of-last-resort policies (Wray (2000)). These
policies raise a number of issues (Palley (2001)).
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The specification in equation (34) includes the perfect version as a special case (let H(a, k) =
e∗/k − u∗).20
Sound finance The specification of a sound-finance rule raises several questions. In analogy with
equation (33) it might seem that a perfect version of a sound-finance rule should be given by
B
Y
=
b
u
= m (35)
where m = (B/Y )T is the target debt-income ratio. This specification, however, implies that
γ =
[
1− c(1− τ)
m
− c(1− τ)r − cν
]
b− (1− c(1− τ))(g + δ)− [cν + c(1− τ)g]d¯ (36)
For all plausible values of the parameters and the debt target, both the expression for government
consumption in equation (36) and the associated budget deficit are increasing in the debt ratio b.21
Intuitively, the debt ratio has income in the denominator, and the ratio can be brought down in the
short run by an expansionary policy that raises income. This policy is not what proponents of sound
finance have in mind.
An alternative rule targets the debt-capital ratio b rather than the debt-income ratio b/u. The
capital stock is an indicator of potential output and targeting the debt-capital ratio corresponds to
targeting the ratio of debt to potential output. The debt ratio b is a state variable, however, and no
choice of γ can instantaneously bring about the equality between b and an exogenous target value bT .
Our specification of sound finance therefore allows for deviations between the target bT and the initial
value of b.22
Analogously with (34) we assume that
u = u∗ + H˜(a, b); H˜a ≥ 0, H˜b < 0, H˜(n, bT ) = 0 (37)
General fiscal rule
The functional and sound finance rules can be seen as special cases of a general specification in which
u = u∗ + ψ(a, k, b, pie, r); ψ(n, k∗, bT , piT , r¯) = 0 (38)
or, alternatively,
γ = γ¯ + φ(a, k, b, pie, r) (39)
The general rule (39) makes government consumption a function of the state variables a, k, b, pie (and
the interest rate r which itself becomes a function of the state variables if monetary policy follows
the Taylor rule (32)). The special cases correspond to particular restrictions on ψ(a, k, b, pie, r) and
φ(a, k, b, pie, r).
It should be noted that both functional and sound finance imply feedback effects from the debt
ratio to government consumption. The debt ratio may not be a target under functional finance, but
it affects the short-run values for utilization and employment, and these in turn influence policy.
20A more general specification would include effects of the debt ratio and perhaps the expected inflation rate on
utilization (i.e. u = u(a, b, k, pie)). The dimension of the system would increase, however, making it much harder to
derive clearcut results.
21We have
∂γ/∂b = [1− c(1− τ)]/m− c(1− τ)r − cν
Assuming that c ≤ 0.8, τ ≥ 0.2, cν ≤ 0.25, r ≤ 0.05 the partial is positive for m < 1.27.
22If the target is set equal to the current debt ratio – whatever that ratio may be – the task of the rule becomes to
maintain a constant debt ratio over time. This random-walk implication of a perfect sound-finance rule is optimal in
orthodox benchmark models with intertemporally optimizing households; the implication is not robust, however (Portes
and Wren-Lewis 2014).
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4 Analysis
4.1 Dynamic system
The dynamics for accumulation, the debt ratio and the expected inflation rate are given by (6), (10)
and (25), and the dynamics of k follows directly from the definition. Thus, we have a four dimensional
dynamic system in the state variables a, b, k, pie :
a˙ = λ(u− ud) (40)
b˙ = (r − g)b+ γ − τ∗[u− δ − (1− d¯)g + rb] (41)
k˙ = k(g − n) (42)
p˙ie = µη1(u− u∗) + µη2(k − k∗) (43)
where equation (41) is derived by substituting (14) into (10); g and ud are given by (5) and (4); τ∗
can be found by substituting (28) into (29). The determination of the utilization rate u, the interest
rate r, and government consumption γ depends on the fiscal and monetary policy regime.
4.2 Pure monetary policy
This section examines stabilization through monetary policy. Fiscal policy is passive, and both gov-
ernment consumption and the tax rate are assumed to be at their steady growth values, γ = γ¯, τ = τ∗.
The interest rate affects investment both in the short and the long run. Substituting (4) and (32)
in (5) gives the short-run investment function:
g = a+ [a1 − (a1θ + a2)ρ˜1](u− u∗)− (a1θ + a2)[ρ˜2(k − k∗) + ρ˜3(pie − piT )] (44)
The dynamic element of the specification, equation (6), can also be rewritten; plugging (4) and (32)
into (6), we have:
a˙ = λ[(1− θρ˜1)(u− u∗)− θρ˜2(k − k∗)− θρ˜3(pie − piT )] (45)
The short-run solution for u can be found by substituting (32) and (44) into the equilibrium
condition (26):
u(a, b, k, pie) = {c(1− τ∗)[r¯ − ρ˜1u∗ + ρ˜2(k − k∗) + ρ˜3(pie − piT )]b (46)
+ cν(b+ d¯) + [1− c(1− τ∗)(1− d¯)][a− g1u∗ − g2(k − k∗)− g3(pie − piT )]
+ [1− c(1− τ∗)]δ + γ¯}/∆
where ∆ ≡ 1−c(1−τ∗)(1+ ρ˜1b)− [1−c(1−τ∗)(1− d¯)]g1 > 0, g1 ≡ a1−(a1θ+a2)ρ˜1, g2 ≡ (a1θ+a2)ρ˜2,
and g3 ≡ (a1θ + a2)ρ˜3.23 24
23The signs of g2 and g3 are unambiguously positive. For given a1 and a2, however, g1 can be negative if the response
of the interest rate to utilization is strong (high ρ1) and the desired utilization is sensitive to variations in the interest
rate (high θ).
24The dynamic system is economically meaningful only if the short-run solution for output (utilization) is positive
and stable. This in turn, requires that
∆ ≡ 1− c(1− τ∗)(1 + ρ˜1b)− [1− c(1− τ∗)(1− d¯)]g1 > 0 (47)
It follows from (47) that with an active monetary policy (ρ˜1 > 0) there is an upper limit to the debt ratio. The upper
limit is formally given by
b <
1− c(1− τ∗)− [1− c(1− τ∗)(1− d¯)]g1
ρ˜1c(1− τ∗)
≡ b¯
If the debt increases above this threshold b¯, short-run stability is lost. We assume that this inequality condition is met.
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Substituting (46) back in (32) and (44), we obtain the short-run equilibrium values of the real
interest rate and the accumulation rate:
r = r¯ + ρ˜1[u(a, b, k, pi
e)− u∗] + ρ˜2(k − k∗) + ρ˜3(pie − piT ) ≡ r(a, b, k, pie) (48)
g = a+ g1[u(a, b, k, pi
e)− u∗]− g2(k − k∗)− g3(pie − piT ) ≡ g(a, b, k, pie) (49)
Putting together the pieces, we have a four dimensional system in the (a, b, k, pie) space.
a˙ = λ(1− θρ˜1)(u− u∗)− λθρ˜2(k − k∗)− λθρ˜3(pie − piT ) (50)
b˙ = (r − g)b+ γ¯ − τ∗[u− (1− d¯)g − δ + rb] (51)
k˙ = k(g − n) (52)
p˙ie = µη1(u− u∗) + µη2(k − k∗) (53)
where u is given by (46), and r and g by (48) and (49).
By construction (a, b, k, pie) = (n, b∗, k∗, piT ) is a stationary point.25 The local stability properties
are determined by the Jacobian of the system and, as shown in Appendix C, monetary policy in the
form of a Taylor rule stabilizes the system if
1. z ≡ n[1− c(1− τ∗)] + cντ∗ − r¯(1− c)(1− τ∗) > 0,
2. θ > θ ≡ [(cn+ cν)(1− τ∗)b∗]/z, and
3. ρ2 is sufficiently large.
The stabilizing effects of monetary policy depend on the value of the debt ratio and the sensitivity
of the inertial element of investment (a) to changes in the interest rate (θ). Intuitively, a monetary
contraction – a rise in interest rates – increases households’ net interest income and raises consumption
when the debt ratio is positive; the larger the debt, the stronger this induced fiscal expansion and the
concomitant, destabilizing effect on a˙. For monetary stabilization to be successful, the contractionary
effect of interest rates on investment must be sufficiently strong, that is, the sensitivity of a˙ to changes
in the interest rate (θ) must be sufficiently high. If this condition is satisfied, local stability can be
achieved by choosing a large value of ρ2. Conversely, stability cannot be obtained through monetary
policy if θ is small. The critical value of θ depends on the debt ratio b∗ as well as on the various
parameters, including r¯, n, c and cν .
26
In interpreting this result, it should be noted that b∗ – the steady growth value of the debt ratio –
is itself endogenous and depends on c, cν , d¯ and γ¯ (equation (28)). A fall in γ¯, for instance, raises b
∗
but also affects the tax rate τ∗. Thus, the destabilizing effect of a reduction in γ¯ and the associated
rise in b∗ involves two mechanisms: the net interest effect on demand is blunted by an increase in
the sensitivity of total interest payments (a destabilizing effect) to changes in the interest rate and,
second, for plausible parameter values a reduction in government consumption will reduce the tax
rate and thereby the automatic fiscal stabilizer.27 Monetary policy is made less powerful via the first
mechanism while the second mechanism raises the need for stabilization.
25The equations defining the set of stationary solutions are non-linear and, in general, will have multiple solutions.
26The analysis has affinities with Franke’s (2015) examination of monetary policy in a Harrodian model. Franke does
not consider the debt ratio (there is no fiscal policy) and the ratio of capital to the labor force. By setting b = τ = γ = 0,
however, and leaving out k from the Taylor rule, our four dimensional system reduces to a two dimensional system with
properties that are similar to those in Franke’s 2D system. The main difference is that the stability conditions are more
restrictive in our setting because of differences in the specifications of consumption and investment.
27If n+cν−(1−c)r > 0 and r > n, a fall in γ reduces τ∗. The combination of a higher b∗ and lower τ∗ unambiguously
increases the threshold θ. The effect on θ of a fall in γ is ambiguous if n+ cν − (1− c)r > 0 and r < n.
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4.3 Functional finance with passive monetary policy
In this regime the real interest rate is kept constant at r = r¯, and the tax rate is given by equation
(29).
Perfect adjustment Consider first a ‘perfect functional finance rule’ without active monetary policy.
In this case, neither the debt ratio nor the expected inflation rate affects the dynamics of a and k;
equations (33), (4), (40) and (42) yield a two dimensional system:
a˙ = λ
(
e∗
k
− u∗
)
(54)
k˙ = k
[
a+ a1
(
e∗
k
− u∗
)
− n
]
(55)
In a benchmark Harrodian case with a1 = 0, the system has a predator-prey structure and the dynamics
produce conservative fluctuations in a, k. Somewhat paradoxically, the stabilization of the employment
rate does not stabilize the state variables: starting from an arbitrary initial position with (a, k) 6=
(n, e∗/u∗) we get persistent fluctuations with a constant amplitude. Intuitively, keeping uk = e∗ leads
to overshooting. A low initial ratio of capital to the labor force must be compensated by a high
utilization rate to maintain full employment; high utilization leads to an increasing accumulation rate,
and when the capital-labor ratio k has reached its steady growth value, the accumulation rate will be
above the natural rate.
The extended Harrodian investment function introduces an instantaneous effect of utilization on
investment. This effect stabilizes the system: it yields a negative feedback from k to k˙, and (evaluated
at the stationary point) the Jacobian takes the form
J(a, k) =
 0 −λ e∗k2
k −a1 e∗k
 (56)
Thus, det J > 0, trJ < 0 and the stationary point is locally stable. In fact, Olech’s theorem applies in
this case and we have global stability, assuming a1 > 0.
28
Imperfect functional finance Using (34), (4), (40) and (42) the dynamic system for a, k is again
separable from the b−dynamics. The 2D system now is given by
a˙ = λH(a, k); H2 < 0 (57)
k˙ = k[a+ a1H(a, k)− n] (58)
with Jacobian
J(a, k) =
 λH1 λH2
k(1 + a1H1) ka1H2
 (59)
H2 is negative and the determinant (−kλH2) therefore will be positive. The sign of the trace –
trJ = λH1 + ka1H2 – is ambiguous, however: the destabilizing effects of a positive partial H1 may be
offset by a negative value of the partial H2 if a1 > 0.
28A system is globally stable if (i) trJ < 0 and det J > 0 everywhere and if either (ii) the product of the diagonal
elements is positive everywhere or (iii) the product of the off-diagonal elements is negative everywhere (Olech 1963). It
is readily seen that if k˜ = log k, conditions (i) and (iii) are satisfied for the transformed system in (a, k˜).
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In the benchmark Harrodian case with a1 = 0, local stability would have required that H1 < 0.
Intuitively, to stabilize the system in this case would require an implausibly strong fiscal response
to an increase in the accumulation rate: higher investment increases demand and output, and this
expansionary effect must be more than offset by fiscal contraction.
Debt and inflation dynamics under functional finance The dynamics of (a, k) are independent
of the debt dynamics under the functional finance rules that we have considered. Assuming stability
of the (a, k) dynamics, we now examine the implications for debt and inflation.
The stabilization of a implies that u = u∗, and the stabilization of k that g = n. Using equation
(26) we therefore have
dγ
db
= −[c(1− τ∗)r¯ + cν ] (60)
The value of ∂γ/∂b is negative: in order for the utilization rate to remain at u∗, the positive demand
effect from an increase in the debt ratio must be met by a reduction in government consumption.
With g = n, u = u∗ and r = r¯, the stability condition for the debt dynamics – equation (41) – can
now be written
∂b˙
∂b
= (1− τ∗)r¯ − n+ ∂γ
∂b
= (1− τ∗)(1− c)r¯ − n− cν < 0 (61)
Standard estimates suggest that cν is about 0.2 (see section 2.2.3), and the negative response of γ
to a rise in b is strong enough to stabilize the debt dynamics for all plausible parameter values. The
stationary solution for b is given by equation (28) and γ = γ¯ at the stationary point.29
Expected inflation will also be constant asymptotically (and equal to actual inflation). This follows
from the exponential convergence of u to u∗ and k to k∗. In general, however, the asymptotic value of
pi will not be equal to the target piT .
4.4 Combining imperfect functional finance and a Taylor rule
Combining the imperfect functional finance rule (34) with the Taylor rule (32) and using (44)-(45), we
get a three dimensional system:
a˙ = λ[(1− θρ˜1)H(a, k)− θρ˜2(k − k∗)− θρ˜3(pie − piT )] (62)
k˙ = k{a+ [a1 − (a1θ + a2)ρ˜1]H(a, k)− (a1θ + a2)[ρ˜2(k − k∗) + ρ˜3(pie − piT )]− n} (63)
p˙ie = µ[η1H(a, k) + η2(k − k∗)] (64)
29The debt dynamics can be written
b˙ = (r − g)b+ γ − τ(u− δ − (1− d¯)g + rb)
By construction, we have
0 = (r − g)b∗ + γ¯ − τ∗(u∗ − δ − (1− d¯)n+ rb∗)
It follows that if τ = τ∗, u = u∗ and g → n then
b˙→ (r(1− τ∗)− n)(b− b∗) + (γ − γ¯)
Now, if a = n, k = k∗ and H = 0,
γ = u∗(1− c(1− τ∗))− (c(1− τ∗)r + cν)b− (1− c(1− τ∗))(n+ δ)− (cν + c(1− τ∗)n)d¯
γ¯ = u∗(1− c(1− τ∗))− (c(1− τ∗)r + cν)b∗ − (1− c(1− τ∗))(n+ δ)− (cν + c(1− τ∗)n)d¯
Hence
b˙→ [r(1− τ∗)− n− c(1− τ∗)r − cν ](b− b∗)
where b∗ is given by (28).
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The system has a stationary solution at (a, k, pie) = (n, k∗, piT ), and if the system is stable, the last
state variable b will also converge, b→ b∗; the analysis in section 4.3 applies here too.
The interaction between fiscal and monetary policy is quite complex, but as shown in Appendix D:
• Functional finance on its own cannot ensure asymptotic stability in the benchmark Harrodian
case with predetermined accumulation (a1 = a2 = 0) if H1 > 0. Adding a strong monetary policy
with ρ˜1θ > 1, however, can stabilize the system in this case.
• Functional finance can stabilize the 2D system in (a, k) if the condition λH1 + ka1H2 < 0 is met
and r = r¯. But adding a Taylor rule with a strong reaction of the interest rate to utilization (a
large value of the parameter ρ˜1) leads to instability in this case.
Thus, depending on parameter values the introduction of the same monetary policy can be stabilizing
or destabilizing. Given the complexity of the 3D system, a full intuition for this result is not obvious.
As a partial insight, however, observe that the stability of the functional finance system derives from
the contractionary response of fiscal policy to a rise in k (which also raises e for a given value of u);
the resulting decline in utilization produces a negative feedback effect on accumulation and thereby
on k˙. This stabilizing feedback can be nullified by an active monetary policy which reacts to a decline
in u by reducing the interest rate, thereby stimulating accumulation.
4.5 Sound finance
The sound-finance rule implies a two dimensional system in (a, b):
a˙ = λH˜(a, b) (65)
b˙ = (r¯ − g)b+ [1− c(1− τ)][u∗ + H˜(a, b)− g − δ]− [c(1− τ)r + cν ]b
− [cν + c(1− τ)g]d¯− τ [u∗ + H˜(a, b) + r¯b− (1− d¯)g − δ] (66)
where g = a+ a1H˜(a, b). The Jacobian matrix is given by
J(a, b) =
λH˜a λH˜b
H˜a(1− c)(1− τ) r¯(1− τ)(1− c)− g − cν
−(1 + a1H˜a)[b+ 1− (c+ (1− c)τ)(1− d¯)] +H˜b(1− c)(1− τ)
−a1H˜b[b+ 1− (c+ (1− c)τ)(1− d¯)]

The determinant of the Jacobian matrix is
det J = λ{Ha[r¯(1− τ)(1− c)− g − cν ] + H˜b[b+ 1− (1− d¯)(c+ (1− c)τ)]} (67)
With benchmark values of cν of about 0.2, the term [r¯(1−τ)(1−c)−g−cν ] is negative for all plausible
parameter values. Since H˜a ≥ 0 and H˜b < 0, the determinant therefore becomes negative, and we get
saddle-point instability.30
30The alternative definition of sound finance in footnote 22 – adjusting policy to maintain any given debt ratio – also
produces instability. A stationary b requires b˙ to be kept at zero. Using (10), we get:
γ = τ∗[u+ r¯b− (1− d¯)g − δ]− (r¯ − g)b (68)
where g is given by g = a+ a1(u− u∗). Substituting (68) in (27) and solve for u, we obtain
u =
b+ 1− (1− d¯)[c+ τ(1− c)]
(1− c)(1− τ)− a1[b+ 1− (1− d¯)(c+ τ(1− c))]
a+ u0 (69)
where u0 is a constant. Utilization is increasing in a which produces instability, just as in the benchmark Harrodian
case.
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Even if the stationary point had been stable, the system contains no mechanism to equalize the
warranted and natural growth rates. To see this, note that H˜(a, b) = 0 and a = g at a stationary
point. The equalization of warranted and natural growth rates therefore requires that H˜(n, b) = 0.
This equation determines a unique value of b. Only by a fluke – if bT = b∗ – will the debt ratio be
stationary for this value of b in combination with a = g = n (equation 66). Targeting the right debt
ratio, finally, still fails to pin down a stationary solution for the employment rate e and the ratio of
capital to the labor force k. There is no feedback from the employment rate to fiscal policy. To ensure
full employment at the stationary point, a fiscal rule of this kind would need to be combined with an
employment sensitive monetary policy.
We may note that instability persists, even if H˜a = 0 (that is, even if fiscal policy offsets the demand
effects of Harrodian shifts in the investment function). In this special case, the stationary solution
does imply that b = bT , but the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is unambiguously negative:
det J = λ[bT + 1− (1− d¯)(c+ (1− c)τ)]H˜ ′(bT ) < 0 (70)
Intuitively, an increase in the debt ratio slows down capital accumulation (∂a˙/∂b < 0) and this tends
to accelerate debt accumulation (∂b˙/∂a < 0).
4.6 Sound finance and monetary policy
A sound-finance rule, u = u∗ + H˜(a, b), in combination with the Taylor rule (32) yields the following
four dimensional system:
a˙ = λ[(1− θρ˜1)H˜(a, b)− θρ˜2(k − k∗)− θρ˜3(pie − piT )] (71)
b˙ = (r − g)b+ γ − τ [u∗ + H˜(a, b) + rb− (1− d¯)g − δ] (72)
k˙ = k(g − n) (73)
p˙ie = µ[η1H˜(a, b) + η2(k − k∗)] (74)
where
γ = [u∗ + H˜(a, b)][1− c(1− τ)]− [c(1− τ)r + cν ]b− (1− c(1− τ))(g + δ) (75)
− [cν + c(1− τ)g]d¯
r = r¯ + ρ˜1H˜(a, b) + ρ˜2(k − k∗) + ρ˜3(pie − piT ) (76)
g = a+ [a1 − (a1θ + a2)ρ˜1]H˜(a, b)− (a1θ + a2)[ρ˜2(k − k∗) + ρ˜3(pie − piT )] (77)
It should be noted, first, that we only have r = r¯ and γ = γ¯ at a stationary point if the target
debt ratio bT equals the steady-growth value b∗ in equation (28).31 Picking the wrong debt target
is incompatible with full employment growth and the achievement of the desired values of interest
rate and government consumption. Insofar as there is a choice of technique, the Leontief production
function (equation 3) would therefore need to be modified. Disregarding this problem, the introduction
of a Taylor rule can stabilize a sound-finance system; see Appendix E for details).
It may not be surprising that a sufficiently strong Taylor rule may be able to tame the intrinsic
instability of sound finance. More interesting, perhaps, sound finance and Taylor rules can be com-
plementary: a system that is unstable using a Taylor rule and passive fiscal policy can in some cases
31To see this, note that the stationarity of a and k requires u = ud and g = n, respectively, which, using the expressions
for g and ud, implies n = a − a2(r − r¯) and H˜(a, b) = θ(r − r¯). If r = r¯ we now have a = n and H˜(n, b) = 0. By
construction, H˜(n, bT ) = 0 and thus we should have b = bT . b = bT 6= b∗, however, is inconsistent with γ = γ¯ if the
product market equilibrium and the government budget equation are to be met: (28) shows that γ = γ¯ requires b to be
b∗.
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achieve local stability under a combination of sound finance and (the same) Taylor rule. Simulations
also show that the introduction of sound finance can speed up the convergence process toward a stable
state. The mechanism is complex, but it appears that active debt management policy in the sound
finance rule can attenuate a major weakness in the pure case of monetary stabilization: the efficacy of
monetary policy is blunted by the existence of debt, and bringing down the debt can be beneficial if
stabilization relies exclusively on monetary policy.
The apparent benefit from a marriage of sound finance and Taylor rules should not mask dangers
that are inherent to this regime. By the rules of sound finance, an economy with high debt must impose
a contractionary fiscal policy (low government consumption), and the Taylor rule calls for low interest
rates in response to the resulting weakness in demand, even if the private components of aggregate
demand are at ’normal’ levels and inflation is at the target rate. In this situation the interest rate
easily hits the zero lower bound following a negative demand shock. The larger the debt and the larger
the magnitude of the negative demand shock, the more likely the system hits the zero lower bound. If
this happens, the economy with sound finance completely loses its stabilizing feedbacks.
5 Numerical illustrations
The analytical results in the previous section can be illustrated numerically. The benchmark parameter
values in our simulation exercises are as follows:
e∗ u∗ δ n r¯ c cν d¯
0.95 0.5 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.635 0.2 0.25
γ¯ a1 a2 θ λ η1 η2 µ
0.1 0.1 0.25 1 0.3 0.95 0.25 0.5
Table 1: Parameter values
These parameters imply in steady state the tax rate is 24.55% (τ∗ = 0.2455) and the debt-to-
capital ratio is 25% (b∗ = 0.25, i.e., 50% of the debt-to-GDP ratio for u∗ = 0.5).32 The shares of
consumption, investment and government consumption in GDP on a steady growth path are 60%,
20% and 20%, respectively. The steady-growth ratio of consumption to household disposable income
is 95.24%. The Phillips curve parameters, η1 and η2, implies that actual inflation, given the expected
rate of inflation, would increase by about 0.5%p in response to a 1%p decline in the unemployment
gap.33 The parameters a2 and θ describe the effect of the interest rate on investment and are subject
to considerable uncertainty. The chosen values are probably on the high side which enhances the
stabilizing potential of the interest rate policy.
We examine the implications of various fiscal and monetary policy rules for this Harrodian economy.
The benchmark parameters for active policies are as follows:
The monetary parameters are chosen to fit a standard Taylor rule.34 The value of the parameter
that captures the effect of a on u is different for the functional and sound finance rules (H1 and H˜a).
32The tax rate may seem low, but it represents taxes net of transfers. Analogously, γ is given by γ = G/K where G
is government consumption of goods and services, not total government expenses.
33We have e = uk and, using a first order approximation, e− e∗ ≈ k∗(u− u∗) + u∗(k− k∗). If e∗ = 0.95, u∗ = 0.5, we
have k∗ = 1.9. Assuming pi = pie + 0.5(e− e∗), we have
pi ≈ pie + 0.5k∗(u− u∗) + 0.5u∗(k − k∗) = pie + 0.95(u− u∗) + 0.25(k − k∗)
34Using e− e∗ ≈ k∗(u− u∗) + u∗(k − k∗), e∗ = 0.95 and u∗ = 0.5, a standard rule with
r = r¯ + 0.5(e− e∗) + 0.5(pi − piT )
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ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 pi
T H1 H2 H˜a H˜b
1 0.25 1.5 0.02 0.1 -0.2 1.40 or 0.89 -0.3
Table 2: Parameter values for active policies
In the case of sound finance, it is natural to assume that H˜a is equal to the size of the multiplier
associated with a in the case with passive fiscal policy: the sound finance rule is characterized by
inaction in terms of counteracting fluctuations of investment demand. Given our parameter values,
the a-multiplier is 1.40 in the case without active monetary policy and 0.89 with monetary policy (see
eqs. 26 and 46). For H1, a positive value smaller than H˜a is taken (H1 = 0.1), implying the adjustment
of government consumption γ is used to offset, strongly but not completely, the benchmark multiplier
effect of a. The value of H2 is chosen to be smaller than the implied value of the effect of k on u in the
perfect functional finance case.35 The value of H˜b is somewhat arbitrary; the general results, however,
are insensitive to variations in this value.
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Figure 1: Stability under a Taylor rule
Section 2.4 (and Appendix B) describes the dynamics without active policy. Given our parameter
values, the two-dimensional system in (a, b) space – (79) and (80) – is unstable: automatic stabilizers
are not sufficient to eliminate Harrodian instability.36 As the initial value of a is lowered by 0.01 from
its steady state value (= 0.03), for instance, the rate of accumulation is falling indefinitely while the
debt ratio keeps rising (Figure 1, dashed lines). Monetary policy alone may help contain unstable
Harrodian dynamics, but, as shown in section 4.2, the efficacy of monetary policy is compromised at
high levels of public debt. To illustrate this point, we compare two economies in which the steady
growth debt-capital ratio is different due to the different levels of government consumption. In our
benchmark parameters in Table 1 and 2, we use γ¯ = 0.1, which yields b∗ = 0.25 and τ∗ = 0.2455.
With these values, the stationary point (n, b∗, k∗, piT ) = (0.03, 0.25, 1.9, 0.02) is locally stable (see the
solid lines in Figure 1 for the path of a and b). The Taylor rule stabilizes the economy and brings it
to a full employment steady growth path with a stable debt ratio. The benchmark parameters imply
corresponds to
r = r¯ + 0.95(u− u∗) + 0.25(k − k∗) + 0.5(pi − piT )
35In the case of perfect functional finance, u = e∗/k and thus ∂u/∂k = ∂(e∗/k)/∂k = −e∗/k∗2 = −0.2632 if e∗ = 0.95
and u∗ = 0.5.
36Given the other benchmark values, any λ greater than 0.0861 is sufficient to make the system without stabilization
policy unstable.
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Figure 2: Combination of imperfect functional finance and Taylor rules.
that the threshold value of θ necessary to ensure local stability is given by
θ > θ ≡ (cn+ cν)(1− τ
∗)b∗
n[1− c(1− τ∗)] + cντ∗ − r¯(1− c)(1− τ∗) = 0.7688
The benchmark value θ = 1 satisfies this restriction.
If the steady growth debt ratio is higher, however, the system can lose its local stability. For
instance, if γ¯ = 0.05, then b∗ = 0.333 and τ∗ = 0.1267. To ensure local stability, θ now has to be above
2.4552 and with θ = 1, the full employment steady growth becomes locally unstable.
In general, the four-dimensional model, (50)–(53), produces multiple steady states due to nonlin-
earities. Given plausible values of all other parameters, as the value of θ approaches the threshold
value θ¯, the determinant of the system tends to vanish and an adjacent fixed point gets closer to our
benchmark steady state (n, b∗, k∗, piT ). The basin of attraction around (n, b∗, k∗, piT ) tends to shrink
as a result. In other words, a low value of θ compared to the threshold value has several dynamic
implications. First, initial conditions become more important to ensure local stability. Second, the
convergence process could be very slow, even if local stability is achieved. Third, the system becomes
very fragile as it is more likely that the zero lower bound will be hit, even by a small negative demand
shock.
Moving onto the case of functional finance, Figure 2 (solid lines) illustrates how an imperfect
functional finance rule without active monetary policy (H1 = 0.1, H2 = −0.2 and r = r¯ ) turns the
exploding trajectories of (79) and (80) into damped fluctuations. The fluctuations, however, are highly
persistent and do not quickly die out.
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Figure 3: Stability under the mix of fiscal and monetary policy rules which would destabilize if applied
separately
The imperfect functional finance rule can benefit from the introduction of a Taylor rule. Figure 2
(dotted lines) illustrates how the combination of the Taylor and the imperfect functional finance rules
can reduce the amplitude of fluctuations compared to the benchmark case with imperfect functional
finance only.
The implications of monetary-fiscal interactions, however, are more complex. As our analysis
suggests, the introduction of a Taylor rule can undermine the stability of the system. As the response
of the interest rate to utilization becomes large (ρ1 = 2), the fiscal-monetary interaction makes the
benchmark steady state locally unstable, and as a result the damped oscillations are turned into
exploding oscillations (Figure 2, dashed lines). Interestingly, with ρ1 = 2, the Taylor rule can stabilize
the system in the absence of active fiscal policy. Instability thus may come from the interaction of the
fiscal and monetary rules which would stabilize the system if applied separately.
Conversely, fiscal and monetary policy rules, which would destabilize the system if applied sepa-
rately, can bring about the stability of the system if combined. To see this, let us modify the values for
γ¯, a1, a2 and H2 so that γ¯ = 0.05, a1 = a2 = 0 and H2 = −0.25. As shown in our analysis, a Taylor
rule on its own cannot stabilize the economy with high debt ratios. With the other parameters kept
at the benchmark values, γ¯ = 0.05 is sufficient to obtain the case of local instability. We have also
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Figure 4: Imperfect sound finance with (solid) and without (dashed) a Taylor rule
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shown that functional finance on its own cannot achieve stability in the benchmark Harrodian case
with predetermined accumulation (a1 = a2 = 0) if H1 > 0. Thus with the modified parameter values
the fiscal and monetary policy rules would be destabilizing if applied separately. The same rules, if
combined, however, stabilize the system around a full-employment steady growth path (Figure 3).
Turning to the case of sound finance, we have shown that the imperfect sound finance rule is
unstable; stability of the system can be achieved only if sound finance is combined with a strong
Taylor rule. Figure 4 illustrates the results of simulations in which the target debt ratio is calibrated
to the level compatible with the natural rate of growth, bT = b∗, but the initial value of b is higher than
its steady growth value (b0 = 0.275 > b
∗ = 0.25). The sound finance rule alone leads to ever-increasing
debt ratios and falling accumulation rates (dashed). The benchmark parameter values in the Taylor
rule are high enough to overcome the destabilizing potential in this scenario (solid).
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Figure 5: A Taylor rule with (solid) and without (dashed) imperfect sound finance
Somewhat surprisingly, the debt targeting policy under the sound finance rule can enhance the
efficacy of monetary policy. With substantial amounts of debt, the effect of monetary policy is blunted
by induced fiscal transfers to bondholders (see section 4.2). Because of this, even if a Taylor rule
achieves stability, the convergence toward a full-employment steady growth will be slow in the presence
of large debt. Under these circumstances, debt management policy in the sound finance rule can speed
up the convergence process (see Figure 5).
As argued in section 4.6, the combination of sound finance and a Taylor rule can be dangerous:
following an adverse shock to a or pie, the system easily hits the zero lower bound if the initial debt
ratio is high, and if this happens, the destabilizing force in sound finance gains full strength. Suppose
the economy has an initial debt ratio higher than its steady growth value and is hit by a negative
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investment shock (b0 > b
∗ and a0 < n). Figure 6 compares the required trajectory for the interest
rate in the two cases: the Taylor rule with and without sound finance. The shock is such that in the
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Figure 6: The required adjustment of the real and the nominal interest rates under Taylor rules with
(solid) and without (dashed) sound finance
case with sound finance, the required real interest rate becomes negative and the nominal rate almost
hits the zero lower bound. When the shock is so large (the initial values of a and pie are so low), the
economy gets stuck at the zero lower bound and follows unstable trajectories (see Figure 7).
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Figure 7: The combination of imperfect sound finance and a Taylor rule: Binding Zero Lower Bound
6 Summary and conclusions
We have analyzed a number of policy regimes and special cases, and it may be useful to summarize
the main results. In this Harrodian economy:
• Monetary policy in the form of a Taylor rule cannot stabilize the economy if the debt ratio is
too high. The threshold level depends on the various parameters of the model. Assuming a
sufficiently low debt ratio, stabilization becomes possible if the zero lower bound is avoided. It
should be noted, however, that we have chosen parameters that are favorable to the Taylor rule
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(a high sensitivity of desired utilization to variations in the interest rate, for instance), and that
we have omitted some potentially destabilizing effects of a Taylor rule.37
• A functional finance rule can stabilize the economy at full employment if investment responds
quickly to changes in utilization (if the parameter a1 is positive). In the absence of this quick re-
sponse, a fiscal policy that succeeds in maintaining full employment at all times will be associated
with persistent fluctuations in utilization and the rate of accumulation.
• The combination of functional finance and a Taylor rule can bring stability with steady growth,
full employment, the desired capital intensity and inflation at the desired rate.
• Interactions between fiscal and monetary policy can be important. Instability can result from the
combination of fiscal and monetary rules which would stabilize the system if applied separately.
Conversely, rules that separately would fail to stabilize the system can in some cases lead to
stability when combined.
• Sound finance fails to stabilize the economy. Moreover, the sound-finance regime provides no
mechanism for aligning the warranted and natural growth rates; the two will only be equal if the
right debt target is chosen.
• A combination of sound finance and a Taylor rule can stabilize the system if the debt ratio is
not too high and the zero lower bound is avoided. In some cases sound finance may enhance the
stabilizing potential of a Taylor rule. However, this regime also exacerbates the danger of hitting
the zero lower bound. Moreover, the debt target affects the steady-growth path: a wrong target
will lead to a deviation of the real rate of interest and government consumption from the desired
levels.
The results clearly depend on our description of the economy, and it may not be surprising that a
‘Keynesian’ economy favors Keynesian policy rules. But similar remarks apply to other evaluations of
fiscal policy rules: the desirability of sound-finance rules in orthodox studies is no less model dependent.
The contingency of policy implications applies whether the economy is Keynesian/Harrodian as in this
paper or New Keynesian as in Kirsinova and Wren-Lewis (2009) or Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007).
It should emphasized, however, that some of the results in this paper are independent of the specific
Keynesian features. All models without Ricardian equivalence imply that picking the wrong debt
target will have long-run implications for interest rates (and the choice of technique) and/or the share
of government consumption in income.
We have chosen to focus on Harrodian multiplier-accelerator mechanisms as the source of potential
instability. The stripped-down Harrodian model has been extended, however, in ways that seem
essential for a discussion of policy. Models with public debt need to include household wealth, and if
investment is the source of instability, firms’ financing decisions should also be given some attention.
Taylor rules, in turn, require that expected inflation be included. As a result, it is hard to avoid
multiple state variables, four in our analysis. The specification of the policy rules can in some cases
reduce the dimension. Thus, we suggested that reasonable specifications of both functional and sound
finance could be analyzed in a two dimensional system. The advantage is obvious: the mechanisms
become much clearer and it may be possible to derive global results (as in fact we did). With higher
order systems, by contrast, the mechanisms can be unclear and, almost invariably, the best one can
hope for is local stability results for special cases.
37Interest rates have distributional effects; a rise in rates tends to favor creditors at the expense of debtors. Debtors,
however, may have higher propensity to consume than creditors. Rising interest costs also reduce retained earnings with
possible adverse effects on investment. Partly for these reasons, a substantial Keynesian literature questions the use
of interest rates as a policy instrument; contributions include Pasinetti (1981), Lavoie and Seccarecia (1999), Smithin
(2007), Palley (2007), Wray (2007), Rochon and Setterfield (2007), Lima and Setterfield (2010), .
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The focus on a specific source of instability and the exclusion of non-policy stabilizers helped
to simplify the analysis. It may also be an advantage for the simple reason that disagreements on
specification may multiply as more details are added to the basic model. As an example, Ryoo (2010)
analyzes a setting that includes Harrodian and Minskian sources of instability along with stabilizing
forces from the labor market. It could be interesting to add policy to this mix, but (unfortunately) the
subset of the profession that buy all the elements of the Ryoo model is likely to be smaller than the
subset that accept Harrodian elements. As another example Costa-Lima et al. (2014) analyze fiscal
policy using an extended version of the Keen (1995) model; critics of the specific Keen model, however,
may not find the analysis interesting. Against the argument for parsimony in the specification, it should
be noted that quite clearly the exclusion of mechanisms that are important in real economies can be
a serious problem. A neglect of the labor market may be particularly problematic. Firms’ investment
or employment decisions will almost certainly be affected if the economy approaches full employment,
and ceilings and floors on investment or employment can affect the dynamics quite independently of
policy.
In short, our approach has both strengths and weaknesses, and the present paper has many limi-
tations. The robustness of the results, in particular, needs to be examined with respect to variations
in the sources of instability and the presence of non-policy stabilizers.
Appendix A: Harrodian benchmark
Let
g˙ = λ(u− ud) (78)
C = cY
where g = Kˆ = I/K − δ is the rate of accumulation and ud represents firms’ desired utilization rate;
I and δ are real (gross) investment and the capital depreciation rate; C and Y are consumption and
output, and c is the propensity to consume. The equilibrium condition for the product market can be
written
u =
Y
K
=
C
K
+
I
K
= cu+ g + δ.
Solving for u and substituting into the accumulation function (78), we get a dynamic equation for g,
g˙ =
λ
1− cg + λ
(
δ
1− c − u
d
)
The coefficient on g is positive, implying instability. Setting g˙ = 0, the unique stationary solution –
the warranted growth rate – is given by
gw = (1− c)ud − δ
Appendix B: Automatic stabilizers
If γ = γ¯, τ = τ∗, r = r¯, equations (6), (10) and (14) define a two-dimensional system:
a˙ = λ(u− u∗) (79)
b˙ = (r¯ − g)b+ γ¯ − τ∗[u+ r¯b− (1− d¯)g − δ] (80)
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where u is determined by the equilibrium condition for the goods market, equation (26), and g is given
by (5). Using (27) and (5) the equilibrium condition can be written
u =
[1− c(1− τ∗)(1− d¯)](a− a1u∗)
1− c(1− τ∗)− a1[1− c(1− τ∗)(1− d¯)]
+
[c(1− τ∗)r + cν ]b+ γ¯ + cν d¯+ [1− c(1− τ∗)]δ
1− c(1− τ∗)− a1[1− c(1− τ∗)(1− d¯)]
To be meaningful, the denominator 1− c(1− τ)− a1[1− c(1− τ∗)(1− d¯)] must be positive; that is, the
short-run Keynesian stability condition must be satisfied (the short-run effect of changes in utilization
on investment must be smaller than the short-run effect on saving).
By construction a = g = n, b = b∗ is a stationary solution.38 The Jacobian for the system, evaluated
at this stationary point, is given by
J(a, b) =

λua λub
−(1 + a1ua)b∗ − τ∗ua (1− τ∗)r¯ − n− a1ubb∗
+ τ∗(1− d¯)(1 + a1ua) − τ∗ub[1− a1(1− d¯)]

where ua = [1− c(1− τ∗)(1− d¯)]uγ , ub = [cν + (1− τ∗)cr¯]uγ and uγ = 1/[1− c(1− τ∗)− a1(1− c(1−
τ∗)(1− d¯))]. The trace and determinant of the Jacobian can be written
trJ = uγ{[1− c(1− τ∗)(1− d¯)]λ
− [cν + (1− τ∗)cr¯][τ∗(1− a1(1− d¯)) + a1b∗]}+ (1− τ∗)r¯ − n
det J = λuγ{[1− c(1− τ∗)(1− d¯)][(1− τ∗)r¯ − n]
+ [cν + (1− τ∗)cr¯][b∗ − τ∗(1− d¯)]}
With one year as the unit period, plausible parameters imply that modest values of λ are sufficient
to produce instability:the trace is positive for λ > 0.09 if τ = 0.25, d¯ = 0.25, r = 0.04, n = 0.03, c =
0.67, cν = 0.2, a1 = 0.1, b
∗ = 0.25. Note also that if (1− τ∗)r¯− n ≤ 0 the determinant will be negative
unless b∗ ≥ τ∗(1− d¯).
Even if the 2D system for the state variables (a, b) is stable, there is an additional problem: in
the absence of active policy, full employment may not be maintained. Since e = uk, full employment
(e = e∗) requires that k = e∗/u∗. The utilization rate will converge to u∗ if the system is stable, but
nothing ensures that the ratio of capital to the labor force (k) converges to the level that is required
for full employment.39
Appendix C: Pure monetary policy
The Jacobian evaluated at (n, b∗, k∗, piT ) for the 4D system of (50), (51), (52) and (53) is given by
J(a, b, k, pie) =
λ(1− θρ˜1)ua λ(1− θρ˜1)ub λ[(1− θρ˜1)uk − θρ˜2] λ[(1− θρ˜1)upie − θρ˜3]
χa χb + (1− τ)r¯ − n χk χpie
k∗ga k∗gb k∗gk k∗gpie
µη1ua µη1ub µη1uk + µη2 µη1upie

38The multiplicative ba term in the dynamic equation for the debt ratio implies that in general there will be two
solutions. For present purposes, the solution with g = a 6= n is irrelevant; policy should stabilize the system at the full
employment path.
39Steady growth would be associated with full employment if the tax system has an inflation distortion (cf. footnotes
9 and 12) and the inflation dynamics (an expectations-adjusted Phillips curve) defines a unique NAIRU.
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where
ua = [1− c(1− τ∗)(1− d¯)]uγ > 0
ub = [c(1− τ∗)r¯ + cν ]uγ > 0
uk = ρ˜2{c(1− τ∗)b∗ − [1− c(1− τ∗)(1− d¯)](a1θ + a2)}uγ
upie = ρ˜3{c(1− τ∗)b∗ − [1− c(1− τ∗)(1− d¯)](a1θ + a2)}uγ
uγ = 1/∆ = 1/{1− c(1− τ∗)(1 + ρ˜1b∗)− [1− c(1− τ∗)(1− d¯)]g1}
χj = [(1− τ∗)rj − gj ]b∗ − τ∗[uj − (1− d¯)gj ], j = a, b, k, pie
ga = 1 + g1ua = [1− c(1− τ∗)(1 + b∗ρ˜1)]uγ
gb = g1ub = g1[c(1− τ∗)r¯ + cν ]uγ
gk = g1uk − g2 = ρ˜2{a1c(1− τ∗)b∗ − [1− c(1− τ∗)](a1θ + a2)}uγ
gpie = g1upie − g3 = ρ˜3{a1c(1− τ∗)b∗ − [1− c(1− τ∗)](a1θ + a2)}uγ
g2 = (a1θ + a2)ρ˜2 > 0
g3 = (a1θ + a2)ρ˜3 > 0
ra = ρ˜1[1− c(1− τ∗)(1− d¯)]uγ > 0
rb = ρ˜1[c(1− τ∗)r¯ + cν ]uγ > 0
rk = ρ˜1u˜k + ρ˜2 = ρ˜2{1− c(1− τ∗)− a1[1− c(1− τ∗)(1− d¯)]}uγ > 0
rpie = ρ˜1u˜pie + ρ˜3 = ρ˜3{1− c(1− τ∗)− a1[1− c(1− τ∗)(1− d¯)]}uγ > 0
The Routh-Hurwitz stability conditions for local stability in this four-dimensional system are given
by
z1 ≡ −trJ > 0
z2 ≡ det J12 + det J13 + det J14 + det J23 + det J24 + det J34 > 0
z3 ≡ −(det J1 + det J2 + det J3 + det J4) > 0
z4 ≡ det J > 0
z5 ≡ z1z2z3 − z21z4 − z23 > 0
where detJij ’s are the second-order principal minors and detJi the third-order principal minors (the
subscripts refer to the deleted columns and rows).
We show that monetary policy in the form of a Taylor rule stabilizes an unstable Harrodian economy
if
1. z ≡ n[1− c(1− τ∗)] + cντ∗ − r¯(1− c)(1− τ∗) > 0,
2. θ > θ ≡ [(cn+ cν)(1− τ∗)b∗]/z, and
3. ρ2 is sufficiently large.
To see the conditions for local stability, We obtain, after lengthy algebra,
z1 = uγk
∗ρ˜2{(a1θ + a2)[1− c(1− τ∗)]− a1c(1− τ∗)b∗}+ z10
z2 = uγk
∗ρ˜2{λθ[1− c(1− τ∗)] + (a1θ + a2)z
− [cλ+ a1(cn+ cν)](1− τ∗)b∗}+ z20
z3 = uγk
∗λρ˜2{zθ − (cn+ cν)(1− τ∗)b∗}+ z30
z4 = uγk
∗λη2µρ˜3{zθ − (cn+ cν)(1− τ∗)b∗}
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where z10, z20 and z30 are complicated expressions that are independent of ρ˜2 (and therfore ρ2).
Assume that z > 0 and define θ = (cn+cν)(1−τ∗)b∗/z. It is readily seen that det(J) (=z4) is positive
if and only if θ > θ. Moreover, straightforward algebra shows that the condition that θ > θ ensures
that z1, z2 and z3 are all increasing in ρ2, i.e., ∂zi/∂ρ2 > 0 (i = 1, 2, 3).
40 Since an increase in ρ2 has
a linear and positive effect on z1, z2 and z3 and does not affect the quantity of z4, z5 is cubic in ρ2
and the coefficient associated with the cubic term is positive. Sufficiently high values of ρ2 therefore
ensure that z1, z2, z3 and z5 are all positive.
Note that if b∗ = 0, the threshold value, θ, becomes zero. Any positive θ therefore satisfies θ > θ.
In general, θ is increasing in the debt ratio b∗ and makes the condition θ > θ tighter.
Appendix D: Imperfect functional finance and a Taylor rule
The Jacobian of the system is given by
J(a, k, pie) = λ(1− ρ˜1θ)H1 λ[(1− ρ˜1θ)H2 − ρ˜2θ] −λθρ˜3k[1 + (a1 − (a1θ + a2)ρ˜1)H1] k[a1H2 − (a1θ + a2)(ρ˜1H2 + ρ2)] −k(a1θ + a2)ρ˜3
µη1H1 µ(η1H2 + η2) 0

The Routh-Hurwitz conditions for local stability are
trJ = λ(1− ρ˜1θ)H1 + k[a1H2 − (a1θ + a2)(ρ˜1H2 + ρ˜2)] < 0
det J = λkµρ˜3[η2(a2H1 − θ)− θη1H2] < 0
3∑
i=1
det Ji = λk{−a2ρ˜2H1 − (1− ρ˜1θ)H2 + θρ˜2}
+ ρ˜3µ[λθη1H1 + (a1θ + a2)(η1H2 + η2)k] > 0
−trJ
3∑
i=1
det Ji + det J > 0
where Ji is the second-order submatrix obtained by deleting ith column and row of J .
Consider, first, the benchmark Harrodian case with predetermined accumulation (a1 = a2 = 0).
Functional finance on its own cannot ensure asymptotic stability in this case and if H1 > 0, the
stationary point becomes unstable. Adding a strong monetary policy with ρ˜1θ > 1 stabilizes the system
in this case: if H1 > 0, H2 < 0, η1H2 + η2 > 0, and a1 = a2 = 0, there exists a value of ρ˜1 ∈ (1/θ, ρ˜∗1)
that satisfies the Routh-Hurwitz conditions for local stability where ρ˜∗1 ≡ 1/θ+[(ρ˜2k+ρ˜3µη1H1)/k|H2|].
Large values of the parameter ρ1 (a strong reaction of the interest rate to utilization) can be
destabilizing under other conditions, however. The effects of an increase in the monetary parameters
40Note that
∂z1
∂ρ2
∣∣∣
θ=θ
= u˜γk
∗{(a1θ + a2)[1− c(1− τ∗)]− a1c(1− τ∗)b∗}
= u˜γk
∗
{
a1(1− c)(1− τ∗)[c(1− τ∗)r¯ + cν ]b∗
z
+ a2[1− c(1− τ∗)]
}
> 0
∂z2
∂ρ2
∣∣∣
θ=θ
= u˜γk
∗{λθ[1− c(1− τ∗)] + (a1θ + a2)z− [cλ+ a1(cn+ cν)](1− τ∗)b∗}
= u˜γk
∗
{
λ(1− c)(1− τ∗)[c(1− τ∗)r¯ + cν ]b∗
z
+ a2z
}
> 0
28
ρ1 and ρ2 on trJ and
∑
det Ji are given by
∂trJ
∂ρ1
= −λθH1 − k(a1θ + a2)H2
∂trJ
∂ρ2
= −k(a1θ + a2) ≤ 0
∂
∑
det Ji
∂ρ1
= λkθH2 ≤ 0
∂
∑
det Ji
∂ρ2
= −λka2H1 + λkθ
The signs of two of these derivatives are ambiguous but it is readily seen that if the imperfect functional
finance system is stable (λH1 + ka1H2 < 0), a rise in ρ1 must increase the trace and reduce
∑
det Ji,
i.e. an increase in the responsiveness of the real interest rate to changes in utilization is destabilizing.
Moreover, if H1 > 0 and the interest effect on desired utilization is sufficiently small (θ < a2H1), a
rise in ρ2 will reduce
∑
det Ji.
Appendix E: Combinations of sound finance with a Taylor rule
The Jacobian matrix around a steady state is given by
J(a, b, k, pie) =
λ(1− θρ˜1)H˜a λ(1− θρ˜1)H˜b −λθρ˜2 −λθρ˜3
ζa ζb ζk ζpie
k∗(1 + g1H˜a) k∗g1H˜b −k∗(a1θ + a2)ρ˜2 −k∗(a1θ + a2)ρ˜3
µη1H˜a µη1H˜b µη2 0

where
ζa ≡ −(1 + g1H˜a){b+ 1− (1− d¯)[c(1− τ) + τ ]}+ H˜a(1− τ)(1− c)(1 + bρ˜1)
ζb ≡ −[cν + n− (r + H˜b)(1− c)(1− τ)]
+ H˜b{(1− τ)(1− c)ρ˜1b− g1[b+ 1− (1− d¯)(c(1− τ) + τ)]}
ζk ≡ (1− τ)(1− c)ρ˜2b+ (a1θ + a2)ρ˜2{b+ 1− (1− d¯)[c(1− τ) + τ ]} > 0
ζpie ≡ (1− τ)(1− c)ρ˜3b+ (a1θ + a2)ρ˜3{b+ 1− (1− d¯)[c(1− τ) + τ ]} > 0
The Routh-Hurwitz stability conditions for local stability in this four-dimensional system are given
by
z1 ≡ −trJ > 0
z2 ≡ det J12 + det J13 + det J14 + det J23 + det J24 + det J34 > 0
z3 ≡ −(det J1 + det J2 + det J3 + det J4) > 0
z4 ≡ det J > 0
z5 ≡ z1z2z3 − z21z4 − z23 > 0
where detJij ’s are the second-order principal minors and detJi the third-order principal minors (the
subscripts refer to the deleted columns and rows).
We show that if (i) z˜0 ≡ cν +n− (r+ H˜b)(1− c)(1− τ) > 0 and (ii) θ and ρ2 are sufficiently large,
the stationary point is locally stable. Note that since H˜b < 0, the condition (i), z˜0 > 0, is weaker
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than the condition cν + n − r(1 − c)(1 − τ) > 0, which itself is almost certainly met under plausible
parameter values. Under the condition that z˜0 > 0, a large value of θ can ensure that
z˜1 ≡ {θz˜0 − H˜bb(1− c)(1− τ)} − a2H˜a[cν + n− r(1− c)(1− τ)] > 0
z˜2 ≡ (θ − a2H˜a)λ+ (a1θ + a2)z˜0 − a1H˜b(1− c)(1− τ) > 0
Note that the required value of θ depends positively on the size of H˜a. Let us now examine the
Routh-Hurwitz stability conditions:
z1 = −λ(1− θρ˜1)H˜a − ζb + k∗(a1θ + a2)ρ˜2 = k∗(a1θ + a2)ρ˜2 + z˜10
z2 = k
∗z˜2ρ˜2 + z˜20
z3 = k
∗λz˜1ρ˜2 + z˜30
z4 = k
∗λη2µz˜1ρ˜3 > 0
z5 = k
∗3λ(a1θ + a2)z˜1z˜2ρ˜32 + other terms of lower degree
where z10, z20 and z30 are the terms that are independent of ρ2. z1, z2 and z3 are linear and increasing
in ρ2. z4 is positive if z˜1 > 0, and independent of ρ2. z5 is cubic in ρ2 and the coefficient of the cubic
term is positive. Therefore we can choose a sufficiently large value of ρ2 to ensure that z1, z2 and z3
are all positive.
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